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Abstract
This paper calculates a partial equilibrium version of the Anderson-Neary (2005) trade
restrictiveness index (TRI) for the United States using nearly a century of data on import tariffs.
The TRI is defined as the uniform tariff that yields the same welfare loss as an existing tariff
structure.  The results show that the standard import-weighted average tariff understates the TRI
by about 75 percent over this period.  This approach also yields annual estimates of the static
welfare loss from the U.S. tariff structure over a period that encompasses the high-tariff
protectionism of the late nineteenth century through the trade liberalization that began in the mid-
1930s.  The deadweight losses are largest immediately after the Civil War, amounting to about
one percent of GDP, but they fall almost continuously thereafter to less than one-tenth of one
percent of GDP by the early 1960s.  On average, import duties resulted in a welfare loss of 40
cents for every dollar of revenue generated, slightly higher than contemporary estimates of the
marginal welfare cost of taxation.  
I wish to thank Celia Kujala for excellent research assistance.  I am also indebted to Marcelo
Olarreaga, Gilbert Metcalf, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the NBER
Summer Institute, the U.S. International Trade Commission, the World Trade Organization, and
Dartmouth College for very helpful comments and advice.
  For different attempts at reweighting the standard average tariff measure, see Lerdau1
(1957) and Leamer (1974).
1.  Introduction
Economists have long sought to have a single numerical measure that summarizes the
stance of a country’s trade policy.  The easiest way to measure a country’s formal trade barriers
is the import-weighted average tariff rate, which can be readily calculated by dividing the
revenue from import duties by the value of total imports.  Unfortunately, this measure has four
critical shortcomings that make it a poor indicator of the tariff’s height and static welfare cost. 
First, the average tariff is downward biased:  goods that are subject to high tariffs receive a low
weight in the index, and goods that are subject to prohibitive tariffs will not be represented at all. 
Second, the average tariff understates the welfare cost of a given tariff structure because it
ignores the dispersion in import duties across goods.  Third, the average tariff lacks any
economic interpretation: an average tariff of 50 percent may or may not restrict trade more (or
generate deadweight losses larger) than an average tariff of 25 percent.  Fourth, the average tariff
will not reflect the impact of non-tariff barriers, such as import quotas, in restricting trade. 
Given these problems, economists as far back as Loveday (1929) have searched for better
measures of tariff levels and indicators of trade policy.   Anderson and Neary (2005) recently1
developed several indices of trade barriers that have a well-defined theoretical basis in terms of
economic welfare and the volume of trade.  The trade restrictiveness index (TRI) refers to the
uniform tariff which, if applied to all goods, would yield the same welfare level as the existing
tariff structure.  The mercantilist trade restrictiveness index (MTRI) refers to the uniform tariff
that would yield the same volume of imports as the existing set of tariffs.  The TRI has several
advantages over the average tariff: it has a clear interpretation in terms of economic welfare and
summarizes in a single metric the effects of varying import duties in a way that the average tariff
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  O’Rouke (1997) finds that the TRIs computed within a CGE model are highly sensitive2
to the assumptions about model specification. 
cannot.  
However, there is a substantial gap between the ideal tariff index in theory and that which
is computationally feasible.  A major obstacle to implementing the TRI is that the requisite tariff
weights - the marginal costs of the tariffs evaluated at an intermediate price vector - are not
observable in practice.  Therefore, Anderson and Neary calculate the TRI using a computable
general equilibrium model to find the single uniform tariff that replicates the welfare cost of
divergent duties across different goods.  This method of determining the TRI is daunting: 
computable general equilibrium models are data intensive and require estimates of numerous
parameters, as well as critical assumptions about the structure of production and consumption.  2
As an alternative, Feenstra (1995) developed a simplified partial-equilibrium version of
the TRI that can be calculated without resorting to complex general equilibrium simulations. 
Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008, 2009) have used this approach to evaluate the trade
restrictiveness of tariff policy for 88 countries in the early 2000s.  They find that the TRI and the
import-weighted average tariff are highly correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.75), but that the
TRI is about 80 percent higher than the average tariff because of the variance in tariff rates and
the covariance between tariffs and import demand elasticities.  They also calculate the static
deadweight loss due to existing tariff regimes and finds that the welfare costs range from zero
(Singapore) up to 3.05 percent of GDP (Egypt).  
Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga provide an excellent snapshot of recent trade policies across
countries, but what about trade policy across time?  Because of the extensive liberalization of
trade policy in recent decades, the TRIs and deadweight losses are quite small for most countries,
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  For a non-TRI-based attempt at measuring the restrictiveness of trade policies in the3
early twentieth century, see Estevadeordal (1997).
reflecting the generally low level of trade barriers.  This is unlikely to have been the case as one
goes back further in time, however, when trade barriers were more extensive.  Unfortunately,
there is little existing information about the restrictiveness of trade policy or the magnitude of the
welfare costs of protection at different points in time.   Although historical analysis is usually3
hampered by the lack of readily available data, the United States has sufficient information on
import duties to make feasible a rough calculation of the TRI and the resulting deadweight losses
for nearly a century.  
This paper calculates a highly simplified, annual trade restrictiveness index for the United
States during a long period of its history (1859, 1867-1961) based on a broad classification of
imports derived from the U.S. tariff schedule.  This period covers the classic era of high trade
protectionism, when America’s trade barriers were formidable, including the Smoot-Hawley
tariff of 1930, through the period of trade liberalization after World War II.  Throughout this
period, U.S. import restrictions consisted almost exclusively of import duties, not non-tariff
barriers such as import quotas or voluntary export restraints that would make a tariff-based TRI
quite misleading.  The results are very similar to Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga’s in two important
respects:  the TRI and import-weighted average tariff are highly correlated over time (correlation
coefficient of 0.92), just as they were across countries, and the average tariff understates the TRI
by about 75 percent, on average, similar to that found across countries.  
The results also show how the static deadweight losses from U.S. tariffs evolved during a
long period for which no estimates of the costs exist.  In the decades after the Civil War, a time
when the average tariff was around 30 percent, the deadweight losses from the tariff structure
-4-
were considerable, amounting to about one percent of GDP.  These losses fell steadily to less
than one-tenth of one percent of GDP by the end of World War II.  These welfare costs are
relatively small largely because of the small share of trade in GDP.  They declined over time
because an increasing share of imports were given duty-free status and the remaining tariffs on
dutiable imports were gradually reduced.  Import duties also played an important public-finance
role at this time; from 1867 to 1913, import duties raised about half of the federal government’s
revenue.  The results here suggest that about 46 cents of deadweight loss were incurred for each
dollar raised in revenue, making import duties only slightly less efficient than modern methods
of revenue raising through income and sales taxes.
2.  A Trade Restrictiveness Index for the United States
Anderson and Neary (2005) present the complete details on the theory behind the trade
restrictiveness index.  The standard average tariff measure and the trade restrictiveness index are
both simply weighted averages of individual tariff rates.  The weights in the average tariff
measure are the actual import shares, whereas the weights in the TRI are the derivatives of the
balance of trade function, which are not observable.  However, Feenstra (1995, 1562) has shown
that, under the special assumption of linear demand, a simplified TRI can be expressed as:
(1)      ,
nwhere the TRI is a weighted average of the squared tariff rates on each of n goods (ô ), with the
n nweights (MC /Mp ) being the change in import expenditures as a result of a one percent change in
the price, evaluated at free trade prices.  Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008) rewrite this equation
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  Dakhlia and Temimi (2006) note that the TRI is not uniquely defined for the large4
country case.
  The tariff data underlying the estimates of the TRI in this paper also include two to four5
additional categories of imports: duty-free goods throughout the entire sample; manufactures of
rayon (a new schedule starting in the Tariff of 1930); coffee and tea, which were large and
taxable imports for several years after the Civil War; and duty-free goods subject to special
duties starting in the 1930s.  Some free list commodities were subject to special duties under the
Revenue Act of 1932 and Section 446 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
as: 
(2) ,
n nwhere s  is the share of imports of good n in GDP, å  is the elasticity of import demand for good
nn, and ô  is the import tariff imposed on good n.  
Equation (2) is a highly simplified, partial equilibrium version of the TRI designed to
capture the first-order effects of trade barriers.  The measure ignores cross-price effects on import
demand and other general equilibrium interactions and implicitly assumes that world prices are
given.   Despite these simplifications, this expression for the TRI has the virtue of being4
computationally straightforward and depends on the tariff structure, the elasticities of import
demand, and the share of imports in GDP.  
A.  Historical Data on U.S. Import Tariffs
In this paper, a TRI is calculated using a limited disaggregation of U.S. imports based on
the tariff schedule from 1867 to 1961.  The annual data are based on the classification of imports
into roughly 17 categories based on the tariff schedules that were in continuous use (with some
minor modifications) from the Tariff of 1883 until the 1960s.   (Later in the paper, the results5
will be compared with the results using highly disaggregated import data for selected years.) 
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  The results for 1859 should be representative of the entire period from 1846 until that6
year because the Walker Tariff of 1846 was only changed slightly in 1857 and included only
eight different ad valorem rates of duty, thereby minimizing tariff variance.
  The Multifiber Arrangement restricted developing country exports of textiles and7
apparel.  A Short-Term Arrangement restricting cotton textiles exports from developing countries
was instituted in 1961, and was replaced by the Long-Term Arrangement in 1962 and the
Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) in 1974.  In addition, voluntary restraint agreements on imported
steel were negotiated in the late 1960s and persisted until the early 1990s.  By contrast, import
quotas and export restraint arrangements were extremely rare prior to this time.
Data on imports and customs revenue by tariff schedule were presented in the Annual Report of
the Treasury Department and in the Statistical Abstract of the United States.  These data can be
extended back to 1867 based on various compilations in Congressional documents (in particular,
U.S. Senate 1894). The antebellum trade data do not fit neatly into the categories set up in the
1883 tariff, but this has been done for 1859 to provide a comparison with the pre-Civil War
period.   The U.S. government stopped reporting these data in 1961, hence this terminal point.  In6
fact, calculating a tariff-based TRI after this year would be problematic because of the use of
quantitative restrictions (import quotas and voluntary export restraints) as a part of U.S. trade
policy from the late 1960s until the expiration of the Multifiber Arrangement in 2005.  7
Table 1 presents the average tariff by schedule for the years 1867, 1890, 1925, and 1950. 
Although these tariff averages mask the dispersion of rates within each tariff schedule, there is
still significant variation in the average duties across the classifications.  However, the structure
of the tariff rates across these schedules was persistent over time, i.e., the goods that received
high tariffs in the late nineteenth century were the same in the mid-twentieth century as well. 
The Spearman rank correlation of the tariffs in effect in 1890 with those in 1910 was 0.96, 0.61
in 1920, 0.82 in 1930, 0.94 in 1940, and 0.74 in 1950.  
B.  Elasticities of Import Demand
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  To be theoretically consistent with the Anderson-Neary index, Kee, Nicita, and8
Olarreaga (2008) estimate GDP-maximizing elasticities of import demand, which measure the
change in the share of good n in GDP when the price of the good increases by one percent. 
  Lipsey (1963) presents import price and volume data for various categories of imports9
for the period 1879 to 1923, but they do not match up with the tariff categories.  Another
consideration is that the estimated elasticities depend upon a particular econometric functional
form.  As Marquez (1994, 1999) points out, there are various methodologies for estimating
aggregate trade elasticities and each one can yield quite different results.  Kee, Kicita, and
Olarreaga (2008) undertake the enormous task of estimating more than 375,000 tariff-line import
demand elasticities (i.e., those for 4,800 goods in 117 countries) using data from 1988 to 2002. 
This estimation requires annual data on aggregate factor endowments as well as detailed
information on the prices and values of imports.  Even then, the available time series data are so
short that estimation is feasible only by exploiting a cross-country panel of data.  
The TRI calculation also requires estimates of elasticities of import demand.  8
Unfortunately, estimating these elasticities is virtually impossible for the period considered by
this paper because disaggregated import price and quantity data either do not exist or do not
match up with the tariff categories.   Rather than attempt to estimate the import demand9
elasticities, existing studies of these elasticities must be turned to.  Stern, Francis, and
Schumacher (1976) present a wealth of disaggregated import demand elasticities from different
studies estimated for sample periods ranging from the 1950s through the early 1970s.  They
report the “best” elasticity estimates for categories of goods at the three-digit SITC level that
provide a reasonable match to the tariff classification in Table 1, where they are reported
(column A).  The TRI calculations using these best-guess estimates will be considered as a
benchmark.  The results will be compared with those using the import demand elasticities
estimated by Shiells, Stern, and Deardorff (1986), Ho and Jorgenson (1994), and Kreinin (1973)
in columns B, C, and D, respectively.  These alternative elasticity estimates are also reported at a
level of aggregation that comes close to matching the tariff categories used here.  
There is no doubt that this approach is a highly imperfect substitute for estimating
historical elasticities.  The import demand elasticities could have changed a great deal over time,
-8-
  Even the highly disaggregated import demand elasticities estimated by Kee, Nicita,10
and Olarreaga (2008) mainly fall within these narrow bounds.  They find that the estimated
(weighted average) elasticity for the United States at a three-digit level of import disaggregation
is -1.14 while at the six-digit level of disaggregation it is -1.74.
  In their general equilibrium model, with CES preferences for final goods, the TRI is a11
function of the mean and variance of the tariffs alone, and both of these are independent of the
elasticities, which therefore do not matter at all.  
due to changes in consumer preferences and the availability of different goods.  And yet there are
two reason why the lack of good historical elasticity estimates should not preclude an attempt at
the calculation of a historical TRI.  First, the existing estimates probably give a reasonably good
indication about the general size of the elasticities across different sets of goods.  Most of the
different estimates of import-demand elasticities are similar in magnitude across goods, and most
tend to fall within a fairly tight distribution, usually on the narrow interval from -1 to -3.   In10
addition, aggregate trade elasticities estimated for historical periods are roughly comparable in
magnitude with the estimates for more recent periods. 
Second, it turns out that the calculated TRI is very insensitive to the elasticities used. 
Anderson and Neary (2005, 293) observe that varying the elasticities is “not very influential” in
affecting the TRI because, as equation (2) indicates, the elasticities appear in both the numerator
and denominator and hence cancel each other out.   Indeed, the component of the TRI that11
depends upon the elasticities is very small in the U.S. case.  As Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga note,
the TRI can be decomposed into three components:  the average tariff, the variance of the tariff,
and the covariance of the tariff rates and the elasticities of import demand.  This can be expressed
as:
(3) ,
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  Annual data on nominal GDP is from Johnston and Williamson (2006).  12
  The annual TRI calculations are reported in an appendix.13
where 2ô is the import-weighted average tariff, ó is the import-weighted variance of the tariff2 
n nrates (3s(ô - ô2) , and ñ = cov (å /å2, ô ), where å /å2 is the import-weighted average elasticity (i.e.,
2 2
the elasticity for good n, re-scaled by the average elasticity).  The trade-restrictiveness of a
system of tariffs is increasing in the average tariff, the variance of the tariff rates, and the
covariance of the tariffs and the import-demand elasticities (i.e., trade is more restricted when
higher duties are imposed on imports for which demand is more elastic).   The import-demand
elasticities only matter for the covariance term and, in practice, as we shall see, the covariance is
a very small factor relative to the average tariff and variance of the tariff in determining the TRI. 
In other words, we can still come up with a reasonable approximation of the TRI even without
good information about the elasticities.
The final ingredient is the ratio of imports under each tariff classification to GDP.   The12
total share is very small during the period from 1867 to 1961, about 5 percent on average.  It
should be noted that “imports for consumption” are used rather than “total imports” (which
include goods later reexported) and that this includes only imports of merchandise goods and not
total goods and services. 
C.  An Annual TRI Index
Table 2 presents the benchmark TRI calculation, denoted TRI-A for its use of the Stern,
Francis, and Schumacher (1976) “best” estimates of elasticities in column A of Table 1, and
other summary statistics for selected years.   Figure 1 displays TRI-A broken out by the three13
components in equation 3.  The lower line is the TRI calculated as simply the standard import-
-10-
  Customs duties provided the federal government with about half of its revenue from14
the Civil War until the introduction of the income tax and about 10 percent of its revenue in the
1920s, after which it fell steadily.  
  The correlation between the TRI-A and Lerdau’s (1957) fixed-weight index for 190715
to 1946 is 0.90.
weighted average tariff.  The next lines add tariff variance and the tariff-elasticity covariance to
the TRI.  The tariff variance contributes most to the TRI beyond the average tariff, while the
covariance term is very small in comparison.  Thus, the TRI depends almost entirely upon the
mean and variance of the tariff rates, which are independent of the import demand elasticities,
rather than the covariance of the tariff rates and elasticities.  If the covariance between the tariff
rates and the elasticities is positive, the TRI is slightly higher than the average tariff and tariff
variance; if the covariance is negative, the TRI is slightly lower than the average tariff and tariff
variance.  For nearly a third of the sample, concentrated in the late nineteenth century, the
covariance between the tariffs and import demand elasticities is negative.  This may reflect the
historically important revenue-raising function of the tariff, which implies that high tariffs should
be imposed on goods with low elasticities of demand, as is clearly the case with the high duties
on imports of sugar, tobacco, and alcoholic beverages.  14
The TRI-A is highly correlated with the standard import-weighted average tariff.  The
correlation coefficient is 0.92, similar to the 0.75 correlation coefficient between the average
tariff and the TRI across many countries in the early 2000s found by Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga
(2008).   Both the average tariff and the TRI are quite volatile over time, and much of the15
volatility is due to the effect of changes in import prices on the ad valorem equivalent of specific
duties, which constituted about two-thirds of all import duties throughout this period (Irwin
1998a).  
Figure 2 shows the annual deviation of the TRI-A from the average tariff measure. 
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Because the import-weighted average tariff does not include the variance of the tariff rates across
goods, the average tariff can understate the TRI by a significant margin.  Over this period, TRI-A
exceeds the average tariff by about 75 percent, on average.  Other calculations have found
deviations of similar magnitudes: Anderson and Neary (2005, 286) calculate that the TRI is
about 50 percent higher than the average tariff for the United States in 1990, and Kee, Nicita,
Olarreaga (2008, 679) found that the TRI is about 80 percent higher than the import-weighted
average tariff, on average, across many countries.  In this case considered here, the largest
deviations are found during periods of significant tariff changes, such as the 1910s and the
1930s, when tariff rates were adjusted and import price movements were large.  In addition, the
deviations are relatively small when the average tariff is high, but become more pronounced
when the average tariff is relatively low.   
Figure 3 displays the different calculations of the TRI based on the four estimates of
elasticities from Table 1.  The TRI estimates are very close in magnitude and only occasionally
deviate from one another by more than 5 percentage points.  Once again, this is due to the fact
that the TRI depends almost entirely on the mean and the variance of tariff rates, rather than the
tariff-elasticity covariance.  This figure reveals that the average tariff on imports and all the TRIs
are highly correlated.  The correlation coefficient of the average tariff and the calculated TRI are
0.83 for TRI-B, and 0.88 for TRI-C, and 0.93 for TRI-D.  
These findings give us some perspective on the longstanding concern that the average
tariff measure is significantly biased.  As Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001, 316) noted: 
“It is common to assert . . . that simple trade-weighted tariff averages or non-tariff
coverage ratios - which we believe to be the most direct indicators of trade restrictions -
are misleading as indicators of the stance of trade policy.  Yet we know of no papers that
-12-
  Rodríguez and Rodrik conclude that “an examination of simple averages of taxes on16
imports and exports and NTB coverage ratios leaves us with the impression that these measures
in fact do a decent job of rank-ordering countries according to the restrictiveness of their trade
regimes.”  
document the existence of serious biases in these direct indicators, much less establish
that an alternative indicator ‘performs’ better (in the relevant sense of calibrating the
restrictiveness of trade regimes).”   16
The results here suggest that the standard average tariff measure is highly correlated with a better
measure of trade restrictiveness, but that it understates it by a considerable margin.  Therefore,
the conclusion of this exercise is that calculating something like a TRI is useful because the
average tariff ignores the variance in tariff rates across different goods.  
3.  The Annual Deadweight Loss from U.S. Tariffs 
The reduced-form TRI in equation (2) also yields a linear approximation of the static
deadweight welfare loss that is identical to the standard formula popularized by Johnson (1960). 
The formula for the deadweight loss as a share of GDP is 
(4) .
Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008) show that this formula can be divided into the three elements
that define the TRI, namely, the tariff average, the tariff variance, and the tariff-elasticity
covariance:  
(5) .
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Unlike the TRI, the calculated deadweight loss is sensitive to the elasticities of import demand.
However, it is sensitive to the average elasticity, not so much to the covariance between the
tariffs and the elasticities, which once again will be a small component of the calculation.
The standard static welfare calculation of the costs of protection have many well-known
limitations that are worth repeating.  They ignore general equilibrium and cross-price effects. 
The calculations understate the deadweight losses by ignoring the costs of rent-seeking (Krueger
1974), the dynamic gains from trade in terms of productivity improvements (Pavcnik 2002), the
benefits of product variety (Broda and Weinstein 2004), and the endogeneity of protection
(Trefler 1993, Lee and Swagel 1997).  On the other hand, the calculation may overstate the
deadweight losses because they do not account for any improvement in the terms of trade as a
result of import tariffs (Broda, Limão, Weinstein 2008).  Still, with these caveats in mind, such
welfare calculations are still routinely made and it should be interesting to see how historical
estimates compare with more recent estimates.
A.  Historical Calculations for the United States
Table 2 reports the deadweight loss calculation for selected years.  Figure 4 plots the
annual deadweight loss from the tariff as a percent of GDP using the three components in
equation 5.  Once again, the average tariff and the tariff variance dominate the deadweight loss
(DWL) calculation, and the contribution of the tariff-elasticity covariance is negligible.  The
figure suggests that the DWL from tariffs was highest in the late nineteenth century, amounting
to about one percent of GDP in the late 1860s and early 1870s.  By 1910, the DWL declined to
about one half of one percent of GDP.  By the end of World War II, the DWL had fallen to
almost negligible levels.  
-14-
  Of course, as noted earlier, after 1961, the deadweight loss from tariffs alone would be17
a misleading indicator of the costs of U.S. trade restrictions because of the increasing use of
export restraints agreements, first in textiles and steel and later other goods.
  The welfare loss was much lower in 1859, when tariff rates were lower and much more18
uniform (only ad valorem duties were used from 1846 to 1860).
Figure 5 shows the variation in the DWL calculation depending upon the different
elasticities used.  These calculations are bounded by DWLs that assume average elasticities of -1
and -3.  Therefore, without solid information on the average elasticity of import demand, one
cannot have a great deal of confidence in a precise figure that accurately represents the DWL of
the tariffs at any given moment.  The figure indicates that it is more appropriate to refer to a
broad range within which the welfare loss is likely to fall.  For example, in the late nineteenth
century (the 1880s and 1890s), the calculated deadweight loss falls in the range of 0.5 to 0.9
percent of GDP.  This range, however, narrows considerably with time; by the 1920s, the
differences in the calculations are negligible.  As noted earlier, the United States did not employ
many non-tariff barriers on imports (such quantitative restrictions) during this long period so that
these figures should represent a reasonable confidence interval on the total static deadweight loss
as a result of trade barriers.  17
How does the time-series pattern of deadweight losses contribute to our understanding of
the evolution of U.S. trade policy?  It is not surprising that the highest costs of U.S. tariff policy
came immediately after the Civil War, the heyday of America’s late nineteenth century high-
tariff policy.  High and comprehensive duties on imports were imposed during the war and
remained in place for several years after the war in order to raise revenue for the federal
government.   Only a tiny share of imports was allowed to enter the country without paying any18
duties. If the static welfare cost was about one percent of GDP, the associated redistribution of
income was obviously much higher - at about eight percent of GDP, according to Irwin (2007). 
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This large redistribution and associated deadweight loss may be one reason why the political
debate over trade policy was much more intense in the late nineteenth century than it has been
since.  By the mid-twentieth century, the deadweight loss had fallen to about one-tenth of one
percent of GDP, which not only makes the historical figures of one percent of GDP seem much
larger, but partly explains why, after the early 1930s, trade policy was no longer a leading
political issue in the country as it had been in the late nineteenth century.  Simply put, the
economic stakes were no longer as high.  
The first major change in the tariff code after the Civil War occurred in 1873, when
coffee, tea, and other consumption items were put on the duty-free list.  Because imports of these
commodities were quite large (coffee and tea alone accounted for 8 percent of U.S. imports in
1870), the share of U.S. imports that entered duty free rose from less than five percent prior to
1870 to nearly 30 percent.  As a result, the deadweight cost of the tariff dropped significantly in
the early 1870s.  The next significant change was the McKinley tariff of 1890, which temporarily
put sugar on the duty-free list, followed by the Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894.  Both of these
acts helped push up the share of duty-free imports to about 50 percent of total imports and further
reduced the welfare losses from the tariff, although this was partially reversed by the Dingley
Tariff of 1897.  
The TRI and deadweight losses fell further during the 1910s as a result of the drastically
reduced duties in the Underwood tariff of 1913 and a rise in the share of duty-free imports from
40 percent to 70 percent.  Increased import duties in 1922 and 1930 (the Fordney-McCumber and
Smoot-Hawley tariffs, respectively) and import price deflation in the early 1930s produced a
higher TRI and somewhat larger deadweight losses in the interwar period.  Given the attention to
trade protection in the interwar period, however, the increase in the deadweight loss is relatively
-16-
  The McKinley tariff of 1890 illustrates the distinction between overall trade19
restrictions and trade protection.  This tariff generally increased protective tariffs on dutiable
imports, such as iron and steel and textiles, but the TRI and the deadweight loss fell substantially
because the legislation gave duty-free status to large swath of imports (Irwin 1998b).  The
average tariff on dutiable imports might be a better broad indicator of trade protection in the
sense of assisting import-competing producers.
small in comparison to the late nineteenth century.  Indeed, although the imposition of the
Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1930 and import price deflation helped increase the TRI from 26 percent
in 1929 to 35 percent in 1933, the DWL rises only slightly and generally remains around 0.23
percent of GDP.  This figure is small primarily because dutiable imports as a share of GDP were
just 1.4 percent of GDP in 1929, prior to the tariff increases, while total imports (dutiable and
duty free) were only 4.1 percent of GDP.  But the decline in the U.S. tariff due to higher import
prices and the liberalization brought about by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934
reversed this short-term trend (Irwin 1998a).  By the late 1940s, the TRI and the deadweight
losses were at extremely low levels.  
Thus, many of the big changes in the TRI and DWLs over time have been the result of
shifting large categories of imports on (and off) the duty-free list.  Figure 6 shows several large
discrete jumps in the share of imports that receive duty-free treatment.  This suggest that the TRI
and the average tariff on imports are not good measures of trade “protection” in the sense of
sheltering domestic producers from import competition.  Many U.S. imports do not compete with
domestic production (such as coffee, tea, silk, tropical fruits, etc.) and are often allowed to enter
without paying any duties, depending upon the revenue requirements of the government.  Thus, a
substantial portion of imports may not subject to any trade limitations even as imports that
compete with domestic producers are severely restricted.  Even if the overall TRI is low, imports
of goods that affect domestic producers could still be burdened with heavy barriers.  19
-17-
  For the year 2003, when the Multifiber Arrangement was still in effect, the U.S.20
International Trade Commission (2004) estimated that the welfare gains from removing all
measurable U.S. import restraints would amount to 0.2 percent of GDP.  This cost grossly
overstated the cost of tariffs alone because the overwhelming component of the welfare cost is
the quota rents that were transferred to foreign exporters as a result of the quantitative restrictions
B.  Comparison to Recent Calculations 
How do the historical DWL calculations compare with more recent estimates for the
United States?  Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008) report the only available TRI-based DWL
calculation for the United States for the early 2000s.  They find that the import-weighted average
tariff of 3.0 percent and the TRI-equivalent of 10.7 percent produces a deadweight loss of about
$11 billion, or 0.09 percent of GDP (2004).  This result is consistent with the present finding that
by the early 1960s the low level of U.S. tariffs had reduced the deadweight loss to less than one
tenth of one percent of GDP. 
Other non-TRI-based estimates of the costs of protection for the U.S. economy, which are
also summarized on Table 2, also provide a comparison to the estimates here and bring them up-
to-date.  Figure 7 compares the estimates presented in this paper with the scattered existing
calculations over recent years and illustrate how the figures for the 1950s and early 1960s
converge to the more recent estimates.  Stern (1964) was the first person ever, to my knowledge,
to calculate the welfare cost of tariffs for the United States.  For the year 1951, he found that the
cost was about 0.05 percent of GDP, virtually identical to the TRI-based estimate here of 0.04
percent of GDP.  Estimates by Magee (1972) and Rousslang and Tokarick (1995) put the welfare
costs of U.S. tariffs in 1971 and 1987, respectively, at 0.04 percent of GDP.  And most recently,
the U.S. International Trade Commission (2007) put the aggregate cost of U.S. import
restrictions at 0.03 percent of GDP for 2005.   20
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on textiles and apparel imports. 
All of these later figures are remarkably close to the cost calculations presented for the
late 1950s and early 1960s.  Thus, the long time-series of estimates here augments the small
handful of deadweight loss calculations for recent years and provides nearly a century’s
perspective of how the costs have declined over time to arrive at their currently low level.  
A surprising feature of these recent figures is their small size.  As Paul Krugman (1997,
127) has written:  
“Just how expensive is protectionism?  The answer is a little embarrassing, because
standard estimates of the costs of protection are actually very low.  America is a case in
point. . . . The combined costs of these major restrictions to the U.S. economy, however,
are usually estimated at less than half of 1 percent of U.S. national income.”  
Of course, what has been true in recent decades has not always been true.  Still, such findings
have prompted economists, such as Feenstra (1992) and Panagariya (2002), to question whether
the costs of protection could really be so low.  
There are two fundamental reasons for the relatively low cost of protection reported here. 
First, the United States has always had a large domestic economy that was not very dependent
upon international trade.  The ratio of merchandise imports to GDP has historically been very
low in comparison to other countries, at about 6 percent, even during the post World War II
period when import tariffs were low.  Only since the early 1970s did the U.S. import share begin
to increase to its current level of about 14 percent.  
Second, for most of its history, the United States has not used highly distortionary trade
policy instruments, such as import quotas and import licenses, to block trade.  Instead, it has
usually employed import tariffs, which - compared with the alternatives - are a much more
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  De Melo and Tarr (1992) examined trade protection for the steel, automobiles, and21
textile industries in the mid-1980s and found that $14.7 billion of the $21.1 billion economic loss
was due to quota rents, only $6.4 billion (0.16 percent of GDP) due to the domestic distortionary
cost. 
efficient method of restricting trade.  The problem with import quotas is that the foregone quota
rents are orders of magnitude larger than the tariff-induced distortions to resource allocation.  For
example, the cost of U.S. trade restrictions was much higher in the 1970s and 1980s than decades
before or after because quantitative restrictions and voluntary export restraints were used to limit
imports of textiles and apparel, automobiles, iron and steel, semiconductors, and other products
(de Melo and Tarr 1992, Feenstra 1992).   The most costly measure was the Multifiber21
Arrangement (MFA) that restricted developing country exports of textiles and apparel and
generated large quota rents.  From 2002 to 2005, the International Trade Commission’s estimate
of the cost of U.S. import barriers fell from $14.1 billion to $3.7 billion almost entirely as a result
of the expiration of the MFA as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that the low costs of protection do not imply that the
gains from trade are small; indeed, the gains from trade could be enormous.  Rather, these results
simply suggests that, in general, formal U.S. trade barriers have been at a very low level in recent
decades.   
C.  Aggregation Bias
The calculations presented above indicate that the mean and variance of tariffs are the
most important contributing factors to the TRI and DWL.  The precise results have been based
on the disaggregation of imports into 16 to 18 categories in the tariff schedule.  However, as one
further disaggregates the tariff code, the variance of tariffs is likely to increase, as Arce and
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Reinert (1994) suggest.  As a check on the extent to which aggregation matters for the calculated
TRI and DWLs, the most highly disaggregated import data available was used in calculations for
selected years (1880, 1900, 1928, and 1938).  These results are reported on Table 3.  Rather than
assign a particular elasticity value to each of the thousands of items in the import data, a uniform
elasticity of -2 has been assumed in each case reported in Table 3 to ensure comparability.  When
the elasticities of import demand are assumed to be uniform across import categories, the tariff-
elasticity covariance is implicitly set to zero (in which case the particular elasticity chosen does
not affect the calculation of the TRI).  As noted earlier, the tariff-elasticity covariance is only a
tiny component of the TRI and for much of the early sample the covariance is negative, meaning
that assuming a zero covariance between the elasticities and the import tariffs will slightly
overstate the TRI in earlier samples and slightly understate it in later samples.  
The results show that disaggregation – essentially adding more variance to the tariff
structure – matters a great deal for the TRI and DWL, but only up to a point.  Moving from the
simple average tariff to about 16 import categories increases the TRI and the DWL by almost a
factor of two in each case.  However, moving from 16 categories to more than 2,000 categories
increases the TRIs and DWLs somewhat more, but not much more.  This seems to imply limited
gains from further disaggregation, at least in these cases.  Yet is also suggests that any particular
calculation that does not disaggregate to the fullest possible extent will understate, to some
extent, the TRI and DWL.  
 
D.  Average Welfare Cost per Dollar of Revenue
From 1867 until the introduction of the income tax in 1913, import duties raised about
half of the revenue received by the federal government.  The important role of the tariff in public
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  Rousslang (1987) compares the revenue costs of U.S. tariffs in the 1980s with other22
taxes.
finance raises the question of its efficiency as a revenue-raising tax.  Figure 8 presents the
average DWL incurred from import duties per dollar revenue raised by those duties.  The average
welfare cost per dollar of revenue for this period is 46 cents for 1867-1913 and 40 cents for
1867-1961.  (The pre-Civil War tariff code (1859) was highly efficient in having a welfare cost
per dollar of revenue of just about 20 cents.)  The spike in the figure around 1890 is due to the
McKinley tariff of that year, which reduced the tax base (dutiable imports) and raised tax rates. 
Behind these average figures is a great deal of variance in the average welfare cost across
different sections of the tariff schedule.  Imports that were taxed a low or moderate rates (metals,
leather) had welfare costs of about 20 to 30 cents per dollar revenue, while highly taxed imports
(silk, spirits) had welfare costs of 80 cents or more per dollar revenue. 
While there does not appear to be any historical estimates of the excess burden associated
with taxes a century ago, this figure can be compared - with caution - to contemporary estimates
of the marginal welfare cost of taxation.   There are many estimates of the marginal excess22
burden per additional dollar of tax revenue in the public finance literature, but those of Ballard,
Shoven, and Whalley (1985) have been widely cited in the case of the United States.  Their
central estimate is 33 cents per dollar of revenue, but the estimates range from 17 cents to 56
cents, depending upon the elasticity of labor supply and the savings elasticity.  In their central
case, the marginal excess burden is 46 cents for capital taxes, 23 cents for labor taxes, 31 cents
for income taxes, and 39 cents for consumer sales taxes.  
While the average welfare cost per dollar revenue a century ago is roughly comparable to
the marginal welfare cost more recently, any direct comparison is problematic.  In particular, the
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average cost of tariffs is likely to be significantly lower than the marginal cost of those tariffs,
invalidating the comparison.  Still, although in principle a consumption or sales tax should raise
more revenue with less distortion than a tariff, import duties were probably much easier to collect
and enforce in the late nineteenth century than other methods of taxation.
4.  Conclusions
This paper presents a simplified trade restrictiveness index for the United States during a
long period in its history when import tariffs were the only major policy impediment to
international trade and formal non-tariff barriers (such as import quotas) were not prevalent.  The
results show that the commonly used import-weighted average tariff is highly correlated with the
Anderson-Neary (2005) trade restrictiveness index, although it understates the index by about 75
percent, on average.  This reinforces the conclusion that the variance of the tariff rates is a key
consideration in the restrictiveness of a country’s trade regime.
In addition, the paper presents annual estimates of static deadweight loss from the U.S.
tariff code for nearly a century.  These annual calculations stand in sharp contrast to the isolated
handful of estimates for individual years in the post-World War II period.  Unlike the low
deadweight loss estimates in recent decades, the results here indicate that the losses were quite
large in the years immediately after the Civil War, at about one percent of GDP.  Since then, they
have declined secularly to less than one tenth of one percent of GDP by the end of World War II. 
This decline in the welfare cost of U.S. import tariffs is due to the rising share of imports that
were given duty free access to the domestic market and the decline in rates of import duty. 
Historically, the cost of protection has been low for the United States because international trade
has been a relatively small part of the overall economy and import tariffs are much less
-23-
distortionary than other trade interventions, such as import quotas or import licences.  In
addition, import duties seems to have been a relatively efficient means of raising revenue:  the
average welfare cost per dollar revenue raised was about 40 cents during the period considered in
this paper, somewhat higher than current estimates for the modern tax system.
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Data Appendix
Year Imports of
merchandise for
consumption
Nominal
GDP
Imports/
GDP
Import-
weighted
average tariff
TRI (A) DWL/GDP
(millions $) (billions $) (percent) (percent)
1859 317 4.38 7.2 15.4 18.4 -0.26
1867 378 8.33 4.5 44.6 47.6 -1.08
1868 345 8.14 4.2 46.6 51.4 -1.10
1869 394 7.85 5.0 44.8 50.1 -1.25
1870 426 7.79 5.5 44.9 49.9 -1.33
1871 500 7.68 6.5 40.5 47.9 -1.49
1872 560 8.21 6.8 38.0 46.4 -1.49
1873 663 8.68 7.6 27.9 38.8 -1.13
1874 568 8.43 6.7 28.3 38.9 -0.99
1875 526 8.05 6.5 29.4 39.6 -1.02
1876 465 8.21 5.7 31.3 42.0 -0.96
1877 440 8.27 5.3 29.2 40.4 -0.81
1878 439 8.31 5.3 29.0 40.5 -0.78
1879 440 9.36 4.7 30.3 41.2 -0.74
1880 628 10.40 6.0 29.1 40.4 -0.93
1881 651 11.60 5.6 29.8 37.4 -0.69
1882 717 12.20 5.9 30.2 40.7 -0.91
1883 701 12.30 5.7 30.0 41.2 -0.92
1884 668 11.80 5.7 28.5 39.1 -0.83
1885 579 11.40 5.1 30.8 43.8 -0.96
1886 624 12.00 5.2 30.4 40.6 -0.83
1887 680 13.00 5.2 31.5 41.3 -0.87
1888 707 13.80 5.1 30.6 40.9 -0.83
1889 735 13.80 5.3 30.0 40.6 -0.85
1890 766 15.20 5.0 29.6 40.9 -0.81
1891 845 15.50 5.5 25.7 40.4 -0.85
1892 804 16.40 4.9 21.7 41.5 -0.82
1893 833 15.50 5.4 23.9 43.7 -1.00
1894 630 14.20 4.4 20.6 40.3 -0.67
1895 731 15.60 4.7 20.4 34.0 -0.51
1896 760 15.40 4.9 20.7 32.5 -0.48
1897 789 16.10 4.9 21.9 33.4 -0.49
1898 587 18.20 3.2 24.8 52.0 -0.42
1899 685 19.50 3.5 29.5 54.6 -0.53
1900 831 20.70 4.0 27.6 52.2 -0.56
1901 808 22.40 3.6 28.9 49.3 -0.52
1902 900 24.20 3.7 28.0 53.8 -0.57
1903 1,008 26.10 3.9 27.9 52.8 -0.58
1904 982 25.80 3.8 26.3 39.3 -0.52
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1905 1,087 28.90 3.8 23.8 37.0 -0.46
1906 1,213 30.90 3.9 24.2 36.4 -0.43
1907 1,415 34.00 4.2 23.3 35.0 -0.45
1908 1,183 30.30 3.9 23.9 35.7 -0.43
1909 1,282 32.20 4.0 23.0 36.4 -0.43
1910 1,547 33.40 4.6 21.1 33.8 -0.46
1911 1,528 34.30 4.5 20.3 32.6 -0.40
1912 1,641 37.40 4.4 18.6 30.4 -0.34
1913 1,767 39.10 4.5 17.7 29.6 -0.33
1914 1,906 36.50 5.2 14.9 25.4 -0.29
1915 1,648 38.70 4.3 12.5 22.3 -0.18
1916 2,359 49.60 4.8 9.1 18.9 -0.13
1917 2,919 59.70 4.9 7.0 16.4 -0.11
1918 2,952 75.80 3.9 5.8 14.0 -0.06
1919 3,828 78.30 4.9 6.2 13.5 -0.07
1920 5,102 88.40 5.8 6.4 14.2 -0.09
1921 2,557 73.60 3.5 11.4 19.8 -0.11
1922 3,074 73.40 4.2 14.7 25.3 -0.23
1923 3,732 85.40 4.4 15.2 27.4 -0.28
1924 3,575 87.00 4.1 14.9 25.5 -0.22
1925 4,176 90.60 4.6 13.2 24.0 -0.23
1926 4,408 97.00 4.5 13.4 25.1 -0.24
1927 4,163 95.50 4.4 13.8 25.8 -0.25
1928 4,078 97.40 4.2 13.3 25.2 -0.23
1929 4,339 103.60 4.2 13.5 25.7 -0.24
1930 3,114 91.20 3.4 14.8 27.5 -0.22
1931 2,088 76.50 2.7 17.8 32.0 -0.24
1932 1,325 58.70 2.3 19.6 34.8 -0.23
1933 1,433 56.40 2.5 19.8 35.3 -0.26
1934 1,636 66.00 2.5 18.4 32.2 -0.21
1935 2,039 73.30 2.8 17.5 31.2 -0.22
1936 2,424 83.80 2.9 16.8 30.2 -0.22
1937 3,010 91.90 3.3 15.6 27.9 -0.21
1938 1,950 86.10 2.3 15.5 26.8 -0.13
1939 2,276 92.20 2.5 14.4 26.5 -0.14
1940 2,541 101.40 2.5 12.5 25.6 -0.14
1941 3,222 126.70 2.5 13.6 29.5 -0.19
1942 2,780 161.90 1.7 11.5 27.8 -0.11
1943 3,390 198.60 1.7 11.6 28.2 -0.12
1944 3,887 219.80 1.8 9.5 25.8 -0.10
1945 4,098 223.10 1.8 9.3 26.2 -0.11
1946 4,825 222.30 2.2 9.9 26.5 -0.13
1947 5,666 244.20 2.3 7.6 17.8 -0.06
1948 7,092 269.20 2.6 5.7 12.3 -0.03
1949 6,592 267.30 2.5 5.5 10.7 -0.02
1950 8,743 293.80 3.0 6.0 11.9 -0.04
1951 10,817 339.30 3.2 5.5 10.0 -0.03
1952 10,747 358.30 3.0 5.3 10.8 -0.03
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1953 10,779 379.40 2.8 5.4 10.6 -0.03
1954 10,240 380.40 2.7 5.2 10.1 -0.02
1955 11,337 414.80 2.7 5.6 10.8 -0.03
1956 12,516 437.50 2.9 5.7 10.9 -0.03
1957 12,951 461.10 2.8 5.8 10.6 -0.03
1958 12,739 467.20 2.7 6.4 12.9 -0.04
1959 14,994 506.60 3.0 7.0 12.1 -0.04
1960 14,650 526.40 2.8 7.4 12.9 -0.04
1961 14,658 544.70 2.7 7.2 12.5 -0.04
Sources: Imports for consumption: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), series U-207.  Nominal
GDP: Johnston and Williamson (2006).  Import-weighted average tariff: U.S. Bureau of the
Census (1975), series U-211.  
Note: The elasticity values reported in Table 1-A are used in the calculation of the TRI and the
DWL.
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Table 1: Average U.S. Import Duties (percent) and Import Demand Elasticities, by Tariff Schedule, selected years  
1867 1890 1925 1950 Elasticities of Import Demand
A B C D
Schedule A Chemicals, oils, paints 34.6 32.0 29.3 15.5 -2.53 -7.18 -1.1 -0.97
Schedule B Earthenware and glassware 45.8 57.2 43.5 26.5 -2.85 -2.12 -1.72 -1.37
Schedule C Metals and manufactures 27.2 35.4 34.3 13.0 -1.68 -1.51 -1.5 -2.0
Schedule D Wood and manufactures 21.8 16.1 22.4 3.6 -1.40 -5.44 -1.36 -0.96
Schedule E Sugar, molasses, &
manufactures
68.7 63.0 62.8 10.5 -0.66 -0.66 -1 -1.0
Schedule F Tobacco & manufactures 130.6 80.1 50.7 24.8 -1.13 -7.57 -2.59 -1.13
Schedule G Agricultural products 26.9 25.6 23.3 10.7 -1.13 -0.21 -0.62 -1.13
Schedule H Spirits, wines, & beverages 119.5 68.5 42.4 25.1 -1.64 -0.70 -1 -1.0
Schedule I Cotton manufactures 40.1 39.9 30.7 23.8 -3.94 -1.41 -1.35 -2.43
Schedule J Flax, hemp, jute, &
manufactures
35.1 25.3 17.9 6.4 -1.14 -1.41 -1.35 -2.43
Schedule K Wool & manufactures 50.7 61.0 43.7 23.9 -3.92 -0.52 -1.35 -2.43
Schedule L Silk & silk goods 58.6 49.5 53.1 30.6 -3.92 -0.52 -1.35 -2.43
Schedule M Pulp, paper, & books 30.7 19.3 23.6 9.9 -0.69 -1.63 -1.2 -1.44
Schedule N Sundries 32.4 24.7 38.3 18.2 -1.66 -1.66 -1.14 -4.44
Source: for years 1867 to 1889: U.S. Senate (1894), for years 1890 to 1961, annual report of the U.S. Department of Treasury and Statistical Abstract of the
United States.  Elasticities of import demand are from (A) Stern, Francis, and Schumacher (1976), table 2.3, p. 22; (B) Shiells, Stern, and Deardorff (1986),
Table 4, p. 515; (C) Ho and Jorgenson (1994), Table 1; (D) Kreinin (1973), 
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Table 2: Average Tariffs, Trade Restrictiveness Indices, and Welfare Losses, selected years 
Average Tariff on
Total Imports
Average Tariff
on Dutiable
Imports
Coefficient of
Variation of
Tariff Rates
Share of Imports
Duty Free
Merchandise
Imports/GDP
Ratio
TRI (A) DWL/GDP
(percent)
1859 15.4 19.6 0.38 21.1 7.2 15.4 0.26
1867 44.6 46.7 0.65 4.5 4.5 47.6 1.08
1875 29.4 40.7 0.53 27.8 6.5 39.6 1.02
1885 30.8 46.1 0.57 33.2 5.1 43.8 0.96
1890 29.6 44.6 0.55 33.7 5.0 40.9 0.83
1900 27.6 49.5 0.55 44.2 4.0 52.2 0.56
1910 21.1 41.6 0.55 49.2 4.6 33.8 0.46
1922 14.7 38.1 0.52 61.4 4.2 25.3 0.23
1929 13.5 40.1 0.54 66.4 4.2 25.7 0.24
1931 17.8 53.2 0.63 66.7 2.7 32.0 0.24
1938 15.5 37.8 0.48 60.7 2.3 26.8 0.13
1946 10.3 25.3 0.70 61.0 2.2 26.5 0.13
1950 6.1 13.1 0.58 54.5 3.0 11.9 0.04
1960 7.2 12.2 0.61 39.5 2.8 12.9 0.04
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Other TRI Estimates for the United States
Average Tariff
on Total Imports
Average Tariff
on Dutiable
Imports
Share of Imports
Duty Free
Imports/GDP TRI DWL
(millions)
DWL/GDP
(percent)
1990 4.0 5.0 32.8 8.5 6.1 NA NA
2004 3.0 4.8 69.6 12.5 10.7 $11,060 0.09
1990: Anderson and Neary (2005, 286), general equilibrium, assumed elasticities of substitution, 1200 import categories, two composite final goods, no quotas.
2004: Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008), partial equilibrium, estimated import demand elasticities, 4625 tariff lines, does not include import quotas
Other Estimates for the United States
Average Tariff
on Total Imports
Average Tariff
on Dutiable
Imports
Share of Imports
Duty Free
Imports/GDP TRI DWL
(millions)
DWL/GDP
(percent)
1951 5.5 12.5 55.4 3.2 NA $183 0.05
1971 6.1 9.2 33.6 4.0 NA $493 0.04
1985 3.8 5.5 30.9 8.1 23.7 NA NA
1987 3.5 5.2 32.9 8.5 NA $1, 900-3,000 0.04-0.06
2005 1.4 4.6 69.6 13.5 NA $3,700 0.03
1951:   Stern (1964, 465), partial equilibrium, tariffs only, no terms of trade effects, does not include import quotas
1971:  Magee (1972, 666), partial equilibrium, tariffs only, no terms of trade effects, does not include import quotas
1985:  de Melo and Tarr (1992, 200), general equilibrium, uniform tariff yielding same welfare distortionary cost as existing import quotas (excluding rents)
1987:  Rousslang and Tokarick (1995), general equilibrium, tariffs only, no terms of trade effects, does not include import quotas
2005: U.S. International Trade Commission (2007), general equilibrium, dynamic, no terms of trade effect
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Table 3: Effects of Aggregation on TRIs and DWLs, selected years
Assumption: elasticity of import demand = -2.0
Year Number of Import Lines TRI
(percent)
DWL/GDP
(percent)
1880 1 29.1 -0.5
17 37.3 -0.8
1,290 44.2 -1.2
1900 1 27.5 -0.3
16 39.4 -0.6
2,390 42.7 -0.8
1928 1 13.3 -0.1
15 24.6 -0.3
5,505 32.5 -0.4
1932 1 19.4 -0.1
16 40.8 -0.4
5,248 43.8 -0.5
1938 1 15.5 -0.1
17 25.0 -0.2
2,882 33.8 -0.2
Source: Disaggregated import and tariff data is available in the Foreign Commerce and Navigation
yearbooks published by the Department of Commerce.
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Figure 1: Average U.S. Tariff on Imports and Trade Restrictiveness Index, 1867-1961
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Figure 2: Ratio of TRI-A to the Average Tariff, 1867-1961
Source: Calculated from data in appendix.
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Figure 3: Alternative Calculations of the TRI
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Figure 4: Deadweight Loss from U.S. Import Tariffs, 1867-1961
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Figure 5: Alternative Calculations of the Deadweight Loss
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Figure 6: Share of Duty-Free Imports in Total Imports, 1867-1961
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), series U-207, 208
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Figure 7: Comparison of Deadweight Loss Estimates from U.S. Import Tariffs 
Note: From TRI (A) and other estimate on Table 2.  The ITC estimate for 2002 includes import
quotas (notably the Multifiber Arrangement); the ITC estimate for 2005 occurs after the MFA
expires.
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Figure 8: U.S. Tariffs – Average Welfare Cost per Dollar Revenue 
